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Maryland’s Response to Comptroller v. Wynne: 
Answering Double Taxation with a Double 
Standard 
In Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne,1 the Supreme Court of the United States 
found that Maryland’s failure to provide a full tax credit for taxes on out-of-state 
income was a violation of the Interstate Commerce Clause (“Commerce Clause”).2  
The Court held that this failure subjected the out-of-state income to a tax from both 
the foreign state as well as the native state, creating an “incentive for taxpayers to opt 
for intrastate rather than interstate economic activity.”3  The Wynne decision is 
noteworthy because it demonstrated the Court’s preference for Commerce Clause 
precedent, and for a practical effect analysis of the State tax, over the more formal 
standards of sovereign tax authority favored by the dissenting Justices.4  Maryland’s 
unorthodox response to the Wynne decision should garner even more attention as it 
will create new constitutional challenges to the State’s tax policy, leaving the full scope 
of Wynne’s impact largely unsettled. 
In response to the Wynne ruling, Maryland’s General Assembly lowered interest 
rates for any Wynne-based refund payments that the State would owe taxpayers as a 
result of the ruling.5  Although justified as a cost-saving solution,6 the legislation fails 
 
© 2016 Charles F. Hilberg III 
  ∗  J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland Francis Carey School of Law, 2017; B.S., Washington College, 
2012.  I would like to thank Professor Michelle Harner and the entire staff of the Journal of Business & Technology 
Law for their thoughtful advice in preparing this comment.  Nevertheless, all opinions, errors, omissions, and 
conclusions in this comment are my own.  I would like to dedicate this comment to my friend, Bryan, as making 
him proud is my truest measure for any achievement. 
 1.  135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015). 
 2.  See id. at 1792 (describing the economic effect of Maryland’s tax structure as synonymous with the “evil” 
targeted by the Dormant Commerce Clause and thus a violation of the Federal Constitution); see also U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 3.  Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1792. 
 4.  See id. passim (referring to the “effect” of the tax as the dispositive consideration).  
 5.  2014 Md. Laws 2960, 2962, 3002. 
 6.  Letter from Douglas Gansler, Att’y Gen. of Maryland, to Martin O’Malley, Governor of Maryland, at 9 
(May 14, 2014) [hereinafter Letter from Att’y Gen. to Governor] (justifying the “determin[ation] that the provision 
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to even solve the revenue loss the State claims it will suffer.7 The legislation also opens 
the State to further constitutional challenges of its tax code by adding new life to old 
constitutional debates.8  This untenable response, to such a significant decision, leaves 
the tax community collectively bracing for an unknown ripple effect.  The impact is 
fully realized when viewed beyond Maryland’s tax policy and considered in light of 
subsequent jurisdictions that will seek to remedy their own tax systems to fall in line 
with Wynne.9 
The Maryland tax system is already feeling the effects of the Wynne decision.10  
Other states whose tax codes share characteristics with the components at issue in 
Wynne will likely see similar effects.11  Maryland’s preemptive estimate placed the cost 
 
is appropriate . . . because it will result in savings in the State budget”); id. at 10 (“Lessening the interest payments 
on those claims . . . reduces the State’s need to sacrifice its own investments”). 
 7.  Compare id. at 10 (estimating the State’s refund costs at $190 million, prior to interest), with Bill Turque, 
Maryland Prepares for $200 Million Hit From Supreme Court Tax Case, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 10, 2014 
(calculating the State to owe $200 million in refund payments, inclusive of interest, but also noting an additional 
$42 million in future, annual revenue losses), and Jennifer DePaul, Maryland Counties Will Owe Millions in Tax 
Refunds Under Wynne Decision, 76 STATE TAX NOTES 567, May 25, 2015 (tallying the total cost to Maryland at 
$202 million, with the substantial burden falling to the local counties).  Neither of these calculations include any 
litigation costs, whether stemming from the inevitable rise in claims that will be filed for owed refunds, or for 
claims related to litigation over this provision of the BFRA itself. 
 8.  For an understanding of the first constitutional debate triggered by Maryland’s legislative response see 
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871) (invalidating a congressional attempt to prevent the Federal 
Court of Claims from considering pardons as evidence, despite the pardon having already been considered as 
evidence in a judgment adverse to the Government, and where the lack of such evidence would relieve the U.S. 
government from owing compensation to pardoned citizens for property seized during the Civil War); Lawrence 
G. Sager, Klein’s First Principle: A Proposed Solution, GEO. L.J., 2525, 2525 (July 1998) (“The case is 1[46] years 
old, and still seems to command the active attention of the Supreme Court.”).  For an overview of the second 
constitutional debate triggered by Maryland’s legislative response see Robert Meltz, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97–
122, TAKINGS DECISIONS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: A CHRONOLOGY 1, 1–2 (2015) (marking the Supreme 
Court’s takings clause doctrine as spanning as far back as 1870, and extending to cases as recent as the last four 
years, with some hundred more cases in between).  See generally DePaul, supra note 7 (forecasting “litigation that 
will challenge Maryland’s retroactive reduction in interest rates as . . . the new local Maryland controversy”).  
 9.  See infra Section IV.a. 
 10.  David Sawyer, Processing of Wynne Refunds Backlogged, Maryland Officials Say, 77 STATE TAX NOTES 
975, Sep. 21, 2015 (“As of the date of the Supreme Court decision, the comptroller had received 9,240 protective 
claims . . . and since then has received another 2,824 amended returns.”). As Sawyer reports, Maryland’s 
Comptroller recognizes this as a growing problem, “The ‘claims are coming in faster than we are getting them 
processed . . . . Last week, for instance our beginning balance was 9,896 returns, we received 441 new ones, and 
we processed 221 . . . [i]t grows each week.’” Id.; see also id. (listing a 249-day estimate for processing regular 
amended returns compared to a 125-day estimate for processing new Wynne returns). This growing problem 
comes with a significant cost as a deputy director at the Maryland Comptroller stated, “processed claims have 
resulted in payments of $19.43 million in tax refunds and another $16.89 million in interest . . . [and those are] 
just on the ones we’ve processed so far.”  Id. 
 11.  See Brief for Int’l Mun. Lawyers Assoc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Comptroller of 
the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015) (No. 13-485) at 17 (listing Wisconsin, North Carolina and 
Tennessee as examples of states with partial tax credits similar to the Maryland tax scheme found to be 
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of the Wynne decision, in refund payments alone, at $190 million.12  That figure does 
not include an estimated $42 million in losses to annual state tax revenue.13  When 
extrapolated to other states and localities expected to be implicated by this ruling, the 
financial impact across the nation is significant.14  
Courts tasked with hearing challenges to Maryland’s Wynne response will need to 
decide, among other things, whether the State may retroactively adjust its tax code to 
accommodate State revenue interests threatened by an unfavorable judicial ruling.  
Concern over this question is amplified by the fact that this “accommodation” for 
the State comes at the cost of its taxpayers.  Although this question of propriety may 
seem obvious at first, a full answer is certainly more complicated.  That answer can 
be found in century old constitutional doctrines,15  though their modern applications 
remain in dispute.16  This new context warrants a revisiting of those debates. 
This comment seeks to illustrate: (1) the underlying legal support for the Wynne 
Court’s finding that Maryland’s tax code was unconstitutional;17 (2) the implications 
of this decision for Maryland as well as other states who must adjust their tax codes 
in response to Wynne;18 and (3) how Maryland’s response is flawed and will subject 
the State to new constitutional challenges.19 
Part I of this comment explains the relevant portions of Maryland’s tax code that 
gave rise to the Wynne dispute and illustrates how the code was applied to the 
Wynnes’ taxes.  Part II provides an overview of Supreme Court doctrines related to 
Commerce Clause authority and sovereign tax authority, which the Justices grappled 
with in deciding the Wynne case.  Part III then walks through the Commerce Clause 
precedent applied by the Court in Wynne, the Court’s response to challenges from 
the opposition, and ultimately the legitimacy of the Wynne Court’s holding. With all 
 
unconstitutional by the Court in Wynne); id. at 17–18 (adding examples of local governments implicated by this 
rule such as, New York City, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Detroit, Kansas City, St. Louis, Wilmington, as well as 
certain counties in Indiana). The examples offered by this brief do not appear to be exhaustive as more recently, 
other jurisdictions not mentioned by the brief have faced the question of how to adapt to the Wynne ruling. Cf, 
e.g., Michael S. Knoll & Ruth Mason, How the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Should Apply Wynne, 78 
STATE TAX NOTES 921 Dec. 21, 2015 (demonstrating the litigation effect that will be faced by states whose taxes 
similarly implicate Commerce Clause protections). 
 12.  See Letter from Att’y Gen. to Governor, supra note 6, at 10. 
 13.  Turque, supra note 7. 
 14.  But see Radha Mohan & Rishi Agrawal, High Court’s ‘Wynne’ Decision Could Have Major Impact, State 
Tax Experts Say, BLOOMBERG BNA, 1, 13 May 22, 2015 (qualifying that because most states already offer credits 
against taxes to other states, “few believe that this decision will create great waves in the seas of tax law”).  
 15.  Supra note 8. 
 16.  See Sager, supra note 8, at 2525 (noting the Supreme Court’s continued debate over the precedent 
deriving from Klein); Meltz, supra note 8, at 16, 20 (listing the 1870 cases of Knox. v. Lee, and Hepburn v. Griswold, 
as the spark to a seemingly endless debate over takings clause claims that continues today). 
 17.  See infra Parts II–III. 
 18.  See infra Part IV. 
 19.  See infra Sections IV.c–d. 
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of this as a necessary backdrop, Part IV of this comment highlights the future 
implications this decision will have on Maryland, as well as other states.  Most 
importantly, this section addresses Maryland’s preemptive response to the Wynne 
decision and how that response exposes Maryland to new constitutional challenges 
to its tax code – challenges the State will be hard-pressed to withstand.  
I.  THE MAKINGS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL TAX CHALLENGE IN 
MARYLAND 
a.  The Wynnes and Their Dispute with the Comptroller 
Brian and Karen Wynne owned stock in a Subchapter S corporation named Maxim 
Healthcare Services, Inc. (“Maxim”).20  Maxim earned income through medical 
staffing services, which it offered across several states.21  Like countless other taxpayers 
nationwide who invest in corporations, the Wynnes received income from their 
proportionate share of the multi-state income that Maxim earned.22  However, unlike 
shareholding taxpayers from other states – whose income enjoys protections from 
double taxation23 – the Wynnes were not afforded an analogous protection by 
Maryland.24  Upon receiving the Wynnes’ tax return, wherein the Wynnes sought a 
full credit for their out-of-state income, the Comptroller instead assessed a tax 
deficiency against the Wynnes on the basis of the “unique Maryland income-tax 
system.”25 
The Maryland Tax Court affirmed the Comptroller’s deficiency assessment,26  but 
the Circuit Court for Howard County reversed this decision on the ground that the 
tax system violated the Commerce Clause.27 The Maryland Court of Appeals later 
affirmed the Circuit Court’s decision.28  The Maryland Court of Appeals applied the 
 
 20.  Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1793 (2015). 
 21.  MAXIM HEALTH SERVICES INC., http://www.maximhealthcare.com/about-us/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2016). 
 22.  Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1793. 
 23.  Cf. Turque, supra note 7 (indicating over forty state tax systems which offer full credit); Edward A. 
Zelinsky, Wynne and the Double Taxation of Dual Residents, 73 STATE TAX NOTES 259, Jul. 28, 2014 (“Those credits 
are common to avoid double taxation of state income.  Wynne raise[d] the question whether that widespread 
practice is constitutionally mandated or is just a matter of generally accepted tax policy.”) (emphasis added). 
 24.  Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 64 A.3d 453, 460 (Md. 2013), aff’d 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015). 
 25.  Adam Thimmesch, Comptroller v. Wynne and the Futile Search for Non-Discriminatory State Taxation, 
67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 283, 283 (2014) (explaining that Maryland’s tax system is “unique” because it 
“bifurcates the state income-tax assessment into two components – a ‘state’ income tax and a ‘county’ income 
tax”) (emphasis added). 
 26.  Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1793.  But see Comptroller v. Wynne, 64 A.3d at 460 (acknowledging 
that the Comptroller did revise the Wynnes’ credit, slightly, but only to account for taxes paid on an unrelated 
Form 502 submission). 
 27.  Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1793. 
 28.  Id.  
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four-part Commerce Clause test established by Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,29 
to conclude that the Maryland tax scheme was unconstitutional.30  Maryland’s highest 
court found that by denying a credit for a portion of the tax on out-of-state income, 
the State fell short on two parts of this test: fair apportionment and non-
discrimination.31  The Court applied the “internal consistency test” to reach this 
finding.32 As discussed in detail below, this test instructs that a statute is 
unconstitutional when, if adopted by every state, its application would 
disproportionately burden interstate commerce.33 
b.  Tax Code 
To best interpret the Wynne ruling, it is important to first understand relevant 
portions of the State’s tax scheme and how those components fit into prior Supreme 
Court precedent on tax code constitutionality.  Despite the widespread application 
of tax credits across federal and state tax schemes, Maryland’s use of a tax credit, in 
the Wynne case, was unique.  Along with this unique tax credit, two common tax 
distinctions drew considerable attention from opponents to the Wynne decision and 
consequently require attention here as well. The two following sections will explain 
these elements and in turn serve to better inform the subsequent analysis throughout 
the course of this comment. 
i.  Tax Credits and Maryland’s Unique Application 
Tax credits are a common apparatus in both federal and state tax schemes.  By 
claiming a credit, a taxpayer is excused from a portion of taxes otherwise owed to the 
government.34  These credits are tools to mitigate burdens from a tax scheme, to 
 
 29.  430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
 30.  Comptroller v. Wynne, 64 A.3d at 463.  The Complete Auto test, relied on by the Maryland Court, 
determined the validity of the tax by asking whether it “applied to an activity with a substantial nexus [to] the 
taxing State, [whether it was] fairly apportioned, [whether it] discriminate[d] against interstate commerce, and 
[whether it was] fairly related to the services provided by the State.” Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 
U.S. 274, 279 (1977).  In Complete Auto, the Court emphasized that by using this test it was appropriately 
considering the practical effect of the tax rather than making its determination merely on the basis of the statute’s 
formal language.  Id. at 279. 
 31.  See generally Comptroller v. Wynne, 64 A.3d. at 463–69 (finding, first, that the tax failed the internal and 
external tests of apportionment, and second, that because the tax scheme encouraged intrastate investment versus 
interstate investments it created a discriminatory effect). 
 32.  See infra Section II.a.i. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  See generally SEAN LOWRY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42872, TAX DEDUCTIONS FOR INDIVIDUALS: A 
SUMMARY (2015); TAX POLICY CENTER, BRIEFING BOOK, ch. 3, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-
book/whats-difference-between-tax-deductions-and-tax-credits (explaining that tax credits differ from tax 
deductions in that credits reduce the taxpayer’s liability directly, irrespective of their marginal tax rate, whereas 
deductions only reduce a taxpayer’s taxable income which is dependent on their marginal tax rate).  
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encourage certain behavior through tax benefits,35 or to eliminate an untenable 
implication of a tax code.36 
Although Maryland’s tax scheme allowed for a partial credit, it did not permit a 
“full credit” for the taxation of income earned outside of the State.37  This distinction 
between a partial and full credit derives from Maryland’s two-tiered income tax 
structure: applied first on a state level and second on a county level.38  What makes 
Maryland’s system problematic is that a credit is allowed for the state level tax, but 
not for the county tax – thereby creating the potential for out-of-state income to be 
taxed twice without the post hoc credit relief.39  The resulting disadvantage to a 
Maryland taxpayer can be illustrated as follows: 
[A]ssume that Maryland imposes a 5% state tax and a 2% county tax on a 
particular taxpayer’s income. If that taxpayer earns $1000 of wages in the 
state, she would owe $50 of state tax and $20 of county tax. Her total 
Maryland income tax liability would thus be $70. Assume, in the alternative, 
that she earned her $1000 of wages while working in a state with a 7% tax 
rate. That state would impose a $70 tax on that income on a source basis. 
Maryland would also impose its tax on that income on the basis of her 
residency in the state. Her tentative Maryland tax liability would thus still be 
$70, but she would get a credit against the state portion of that tax, which 
would amount to a $50 credit. Her aggregate tax liability in this situation 
would thus be $90—the $70 paid to the state where she worked and the $20 
of Maryland county tax. That aggregate liability is, of course, greater than 
the liability that she would have faced if she had provided her services within 
Maryland.40 
 
 35.  See, e.g., GRANT THORNTON LLP, GREEN TAX INCENTIVES AND CREDIT FOR BUSINESS AND INDIVIDUALS: 
FEDERAL AND STATE PLANNING IDEAS 1, 3 (2010) (discussing tax credits designed to incentivize environmentally 
conscience business decisions as more viable investments via a desirable tax treatment). 
 36.  These credits can also serve as a less painful alternative to the political burden of reforming tax codes.  
Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1805 (2015) (offering the tax credit as an instrument to 
“remedy the infirmity” of the State’s existing tax scheme); Zelinsky, supra note 23 (describing the credits as 
“common to avoid double taxation of state income”).  In Wynne, the question was decided on the side of the 
“untenable” implication, that is double taxation, being constitutionally impermissible. Thus, because reform is 
necessitated by the ruling, a post hoc tax credit may be easier to apply than restructuring the tax code. In a less 
“severe” example, a government may choose to provide a tax credit to encourage business activity related to 
alternative energies over more traditional energy industries.  See generally GRANT THORTON LLP, supra note 35. 
 37.  Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1792. 
 38.  The “state” tax provision is provided in MD. CODE ANN. TAX-GEN. § 10-105(a) (2014) and the “county” 
provision is found under MD. CODE ANN. TAX-GEN. §§ 10-103, 10-106 (2010).  While the county rate may vary 
from county to county, the rate is capped at a maximum of 3.2%. Id. at § 10-106. 
 39.  Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1792. 
 40.  Thimmesch, supra note 25, at 286. 
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As exemplified above, an individual residing in Maryland could be incentivized to 
avoid doing business outside the state.  It is precisely this chilling effect on interstate 
commerce that has driven courts to take up countless Commerce Clause challenges.41 
ii.  Notable Tax Assessment Distinctions 
Opponents to the Wynne decision raised two common tax distinctions as evidence 
that the Maryland scheme was permissible.  First is the distinction between the 
taxation of corporations versus the taxation of individual residents.42  Amidst various 
reasons why corporations are taxed differently than individuals, opposition to the 
Wynne decision argued that corporations deserve more tax protections because they 
less readily avail themselves of the benefits to tax revenue spending than a resident 
would (e.g., residents benefiting from state spending on infrastructure like roads and 
emergency services).43  
Second is the distinction between the taxation of net income versus the taxation 
of “gross receipts” or gross business revenues; this distinction is two-fold.44  This 
argument asserts that when applying a tax to gross receipts of multi-state income, the 
tax may escape Commerce Clause scrutiny if the respective state only taxes their 
proportionate share of the income.45  It also suggests that a court’s analysis of a tax on 
gross receipts should be different than a court’s analysis of a tax on net income 
because the implicated authority for each of these state actions are different.46  The 
underlying logic to this argument is that as states adjust tax rates when substituting 
gross income for net income, so must courts adjust their analysis of a tax scheme’s 
permissibility when considering taxes on gross receipts versus taxes on net income.   
As will be discussed in further sections below, each of these distinctions are 
dismissed as illusory and ultimately irrelevant to the question at issue in Wynne.47 
 
 41.  M. Redish & S. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 4 
DUKE L. J. 569, 570 (2014).  
 42.  See infra Section III.b.ii.2 (discussing the majority’s response to Maryland’s attempt to distinguish the 
cases relied on by the majority, from the application of their tax system). 
 43.  See infra Section III.b.ii.2.  
 44.  See infra Section III.b.ii.2. 
 45.  See Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 656 (1948) (discussing a lineage of lower 
court cases related to the proportional taxing of activity wholly within a state, to survive interstate commerce 
clause scrutiny). But see id. at 662–63 (qualifying that even though a tax on gross receipts would unconstitutionally 
subject the income to a threat of multiple taxation, that threat does not exist on a proportional basis and thus a 
fairly apportioned tax would be constitutionally permissible). 
 46.  Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1820 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). But see 
infra text accompanying note 118 (comparing Justice Ginsburg’s cited authority for this assertion with the 
authority employed by the majority in refuting Justice Ginsburg’s claim). 
 47.  See infra Sections III.b.i.2, III.b.ii.2 (speaking to the Court’s dismissal of the distinction between taxation 
of a corporation versus taxation of a resident, raised by the State, and the distinction between taxation of net 
income versus taxation of gross income, raised by the dissent). 
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II.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE ON COMMERCE 
CLAUSE TAX RESTRICTIONS  
The Interstate Commerce Clause of the Constitution, empowering Congress to 
“regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,”48 is complimented by a “negative 
aspect” or Dormant Commerce Clause which restricts states from “discriminat[ing] 
against or burden[ing] the interstate flow of articles of commerce.”49  The Wynne 
Court applied the Dormant Commerce Clause to Maryland’s sovereign tax power.50  
This section will first provide a foundational overview of Dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine, particularly as it relates to tax challenges.  This understanding will help 
illustrate the constitutional lens through which the Court examined the 
Comptroller’s actions in Wynne.  This understanding will also help unveil the 
constitutional precedent implicated by Maryland’s legislative response to Wynne.   
a.  Foundations of a Commerce Clause Ruling on Tax Code 
There is a litany of Commerce Clause precedent, as well as jurisdictional tax authority 
precedent, for the Supreme Court to rely on when considering questions on either of 
these issues in isolation.  In the unique circumstance of Wynne, where these two 
issues intersect, the Supreme Court’s decision in Northwestern States Portland Cement 
Co. v. Minnesota51 is a logical starting point.  In Portland Cement, the Court applied 
the Dormant Commerce Clause restriction to taxes, stressing that local businesses 
could not receive direct commercial advantages through a discriminatory tax.52  If the 
Wynne dispute had mirrored a more typical Interstate Commerce Clause claim, 
brought by an out-of-state party alleging a disproportionate burden, the reasoning in 
Portland Cement may have sufficed and the Court may have stopped there.  However, 
the unusual nature of the Wynnes’ claim – wherein Maryland residents claimed 
discrimination by their own state53 – prompted a closer look from the Court. 
i.  Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady: the Four-Part Commerce Test 
The Court in Complete Auto evaluated the challenged tax with a four-part test. The 
test measures whether the tax (1) “applied to an activity with a substantial nexus [to] 
 
 48.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 49.  Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 64 A.3d 453, 461 (Md. 2013), aff’d 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015) 
(internal quotations omitted).  The “Dormant Commerce Clause” is not an actual clause expressed in the 
Constitution but rather is a term used to characterize the established Supreme Court precedent of reading this 
limitation into the purpose of the express Commerce Clause. Id. 
 50.  Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1799 (qualifying Maryland’s “raw power to tax” as still limited by 
Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny). 
 51.  358 U.S. 450 (1959). 
 52.  See Northwestern States Portland Cement, 358 U.S. at 458 (citing Memphis Steam Laundry v. Stone, 342 
U.S. 389 (1952)). 
 53.  Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1792. 
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the taxing State;” (2) was “fairly apportioned;” (3) “discriminate[d] against interstate 
commerce;” and (4) was “fairly related to the services provided by the State.”54  This 
four-part test has consistently been applied by courts to decide Commerce Clause 
questions involving state tax schemes.55  The questions of nexus and fairly relating to 
state services are obvious in a case like Wynne where a party is a resident of the state.  
Thus, this comment will focus on the remaining questions of fair apportionment and 
discrimination. 
Whether a tax is discriminatory can naturally be answered by looking at whether 
out-of-state income would be taxed at a higher rate than a source within the state.56  
In an effort to “prevent [the] multiple taxation of interstate commerce,” courts have 
included the fair apportionment question to ensure that “no instrumentality of 
commerce is subjected to more than one tax on its full value.”57  Courts have answered 
this apportionment question by employing what has become known as the “internal 
consistency test.”58  This test asks whether, if every state were to adopt the tax scheme 
in question, interstate commerce would be taxed at a higher rate than the intrastate 
commerce.59  If the answer to this is yes, then the tax is not fairly apportioned.60 
 
 54.  Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
 55.  See Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 64 A.3d 453, 463–64 (Md. 2013), aff’d 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015) 
(citing multiple cases relying on Complete Auto as the applicable doctrine). 
 56.  Thimmesch, supra note 25, at 285–86. 
 57.  Comptroller v. Wynne, 64 A.3d at 463–64 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 
434 (1979)). 
 58.  Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1802 (legitimizing the internal consistency test as widely accepted 
and applied). 
 59.  Id. at 1802. 
 60.  The Court offers a helpful comparison: 
Maryland’s income tax scheme fails the internal consistency test.  A simple example illustrates the 
point. Assume that every State imposed the following taxes, which are similar to Maryland’s ‘‘county’’ 
and ‘‘special nonresident’’ taxes: (1) a 1.25% tax on income that residents earn in State, (2) a 1.25% 
tax on income that residents earn in other jurisdictions, and (3) a 1.25% tax on income that 
nonresidents earn in State. Assume further that two taxpayers, April and Bob, both live in State A, 
but that April earns her income in State A whereas Bob earns his income in State B. In this 
circumstance, Bob will pay more income tax than April solely because he earns income interstate. 
Specifically, April will have to pay a 1.25% tax only once, to State A. But Bob will have to pay a 1.25% 
tax twice: once to State A, where he resides, and once to State B, where he earns the income. 
Id. at 1803–04 (citation omitted).  The Court adds an important footnote emphasizing that “to apply the internal 
consistency test in this case, [the Court] must evaluate the Maryland income tax scheme as a whole.” Id. at 1803 
n.8 (pointing out that a State’s label for the taxes must be “immaterial” for Commerce Clause purposes because 
otherwise, “[i]f state labels [were to] control[,] a State would always be free to tax . . . at discriminatory rates 
simply by attaching different labels.”). 
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b. The Development of Supreme Court Commerce Clause Precedent in Tax Challenges 
Three cases formed the precedential basis for the Court’s decision in Wynne.61  These 
cases, decided over the span of just a decade, all pertained to a state’s taxation of 
income with interstate sources of origin.62  These cases are particularly on point 
because the Wynne case called for the Court to apply Dormant Commerce Clause 
precedent to a tax scheme. 
i.  The Risk of Double Taxation is a Violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Two Supreme Court cases, J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen63 and Gwin, White & Prince, 
Inc. v. Henneford,64 decided within just a year of each other, firmly entrenched the 
Court’s stance that even the mere risk of double taxation was enough to render a tax 
statute unconstitutional. 
In J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, the Supreme Court considered an Indiana state 
tax on income derived from sources within Indiana.65  The taxpayer in Storen was an 
Indiana corporation that manufactured road machinery equipment, which it 
subsequently shipped from its factory in Indiana to other states and countries.66  
While the corporation was headquartered in Indiana, it sold eighty percent of its 
product to out-of-state customers.67  Indiana taxed the corporation’s income from 
these out-of-state sales, giving rise to the corporation’s claim that the State’s tax 
scheme was unconstitutional.68  The Court in Storen agreed with the corporation, 
finding the tax violated the Dormant Commerce Clause by creating a risk of double 
taxation.69 
Just one year later, Storen was reinforced by the Court’s decision in Henneford.70  
Gwin, White & Prince, Inc., a Washington State corporation, challenged 
Washington’s tax of corporate income earned through shipping fruit to other states 
 
 61.  J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 
434 (1939); Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948); see Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 
1794–95, (appointing the cases of Storen, Henneford, and Mealey as “particularly instructive” within the precedent 
deemed to “all but dictate the result reached in this case”).  
 62.  See infra Section II.b (explaining the circumstances, holdings, and relevant precedent of the decisions in 
Storen, Henneford, and Mealey). 
 63.  304 U.S. 307 (1938). 
 64.  305 U.S. 434 (1939). 
 65.  Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1795 (citing Storen, 304 U.S. at 307–09). 
 66.  Storen, 304 U.S. at 308–09. 
 67.  Id.  Some of these “out-of-state” customers were actually foreign customers.  Id. 
 68.  Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1795 (citing Storen, 304 U.S. at 309).   
 69.  Id. (citing Storen, 304 U.S. at 311) (finding that the statute taxed income without fair apportionment). 
 70.  See generally Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939) (deciding that a Washington 
state tax assessed on a Washington Corporation’s income earned through shipping fruit to out-of-state and 
international customers, created a threat of double taxation and was thus unconstitutional). 
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and countries.71  The Washington State Court upheld the tax as applying to all income 
earned by any persons doing business in the State and thereby remaining within the 
State’s sovereign authority.72  However, following their Storen decision of just a year 
earlier, the Supreme Court again found the State tax unconstitutional.73  The Court 
was careful to note that its decision did not hinge just on “the risk of a multiple 
burden,” but also that the risk existed for interstate commerce and not for local 
commerce.74 
ii.  Mealey: Interstate Commerce Necessitates a Practical Definition 
In Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey,75 a New York corporation challenged the 
State’s tax on a portion of gross receipts for transportation services that the 
corporation provided between New York and neighboring states.76  In Mealey the 
Court crystallized its Storen and Henneford decisions by simplifying the definition of 
interstate commerce in the tax context.77 The Mealey Court resisted hypertechnical 
methods for defining interstate commerce,78 as being an exercise in “pure fiction,”79 
and instead set “practical lines” as the proper guidepost for such definitions.80  
Ultimately, the Court again found the threat that other states might also try to tax 
this income was enough to disqualify the tax as unconstitutional.81  
As will be explained in Part III below, these cases and their underlying doctrines 
were relied on heavily by the Wynne Court. 
 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. at 437. 
 73.  Id. at 439. 
 74.  Id.  
 75.  334 U.S. 653 (1948). 
 76.  See generally id. 
 77.  See id. at 659 (“To call commerce [that is] in fact interstate[,] ‘local commerce[,]’ because under a given 
set of circumstances . . . a particular exertion of State power [would remain] []valid . . . is to indulge in a fiction.”).  
In effect, the Court ignored these technical “circumstances,” and refused to entertain maneuvering “to label 
transportation across an interstate stream [as being] ‘local commerce.’” Id.; see also infra notes 78–79. 
 78.  See generally Mealey, 334 U.S. at 664, 666–68 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (asserting that the business activity 
is both interstate and intrastate, and thus a more technical consideration is most appropriate for the application 
of interstate commerce definitions). 
 79.  Id. at 660 (“To say that this commerce is confined to New York is to indulge in pure fiction.”). The 
Majority opinion was unabashed in characterizing its disdain for this strained definition of interstate commerce. 
See, e.g., id. at 659 (“us[ing] loosely[,] terms having . . . constitutional significance”); id. (“a needless fiction,”); 
id. at 660 (“[a] verbal device”).  
 80.  Id. at 659 (“[C]ommerce among the [s]tates both are practical rather than technical conceptions, and, 
naturally, their limits must be fixed by practical lines.”) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 81.  Id. at 662. 
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III.  THE SUPREME COURT OFFERED A SOUND DECISION IN WYNNE  
The Court in Wynne divided its reasoning into two parts.  First, the Court laid out its 
foundation for applying Commerce Clause precedent to the specific tax issue in 
Wynne, relying heavily on the three precedential decisions discussed in Section II.b 
above.  Second, the Court responded to opposing arguments by focusing on the 
practical implications of those contentions as well as viable alternatives to address the 
concerns raised.  Section III.a of this comment outlines the Wynne Court’s 
foundational precedent while Section III.b addresses the Court’s preemptive 
responses to opposing opinions.  Section III.c then discusses why this format will 
insulate the decision from future negative treatment. 
a.  Use of Commerce Clause Tax Precedent 
The Wynne Court’s heavy reliance on Storen, Henneford, and Mealey demonstrated 
the Court’s preference for evaluating tax statutes, “not [by its] formal language . . . 
but rather [by] its practical effect.”82  The Wynne Court struck down Maryland’s tax 
for the same reasons stressed in these cases, namely that the tax schemes risked double 
taxation and disadvantaged interstate commerce.83  
Describing the implications of the Indiana tax scheme from Storen, the Wynne 
opinion emphasized that even the mere “risk of a double tax burden,” was forbidden 
by the Dormant Commerce Clause.84  This established that to find a state tax 
unconstitutional, the Court need only to find a potential for double taxation rather 
than actual examples. The Wynne Court used the Henneford decision, which largely 
echoed the ruling of its predecessor in Storen, to reiterate that a double taxation risk 
is unconstitutional specifically because it imposes on interstate commerce but not 
local commerce.85 
In Mealey, the Court looked past technical constructions of interstate commerce 
in favor of a practical interpretation of the activity in question.86  This distilled the 
evaluation for the Wynne Court, relieving it of an unnecessarily difficult analysis of 
interstate commerce itself, and instead allowed the Court to focus exclusively on the 
practical effect the tax had on the business transaction.87   
 
 82.  Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1795 (2015) (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. 
v. Brady 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)). 
 83.  Id.; State & Local Tax Alert, U.S. Supreme Court Holds Lack of County Personal Income Tax Credit for 
Taxes Paid to Other States Violates Commerce Clause, GRANT THORTON LLP, May 26, 2015, at 3. 
 84.  Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1795 (quoting J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 439 
(1938)). 
 85.  See id. (discussing Henneford). 
 86.  See supra notes 76–81. 
 87.  See Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1795 (using Mealey as a basis for its reliance on a practical 
analysis). 
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b.  Preemptive Responses to Protect the Decision from Criticism 
After outlining the foundations of its decision, the Wynne Court methodically 
responded to the opposing arguments raised by the dissenting Justices and the State 
of Maryland.88  The opposing arguments attempted to distinguish the cases of Storen, 
Henneford, and Mealey on the basis of: (1) the superficial application of the tax rather 
than the result of the tax;89 (2) the distinction between applying taxes to corporations 
versus individuals;90 and (3) the different implications for assessing income tax based 
on net incomes versus gross receipts.91  Relying on these alleged distinctions, the 
opposition tried to shift focus to precedent where a state’s sovereign tax authority is 
controlling.92  The majority opinion stayed true to its practical effect focus in 
dispensing with each of these arguments. 
i.  Maryland’s Defense 
1.  The “Tax Neutral” Argument 
Maryland tried to defend its tax policy in a vacuum by focusing exclusively on the 
application of the tax itself and thereby ignoring the coinciding application of tax 
credits (or need thereof).  The State argued its tax was neutral, not discriminatory, 
because the tax was applied to both out-of-state as well as instate income.93  This 
defense is a red herring because it was not the tax itself that was unconstitutional.  
Instead, it was the practical effect resulting from the tax’s denial of a subsequent credit 
for out-of-state income that was unconstitutional.94  The Court avoided this fallacy 
by recognizing that the Dormant Commerce Clause bans activity even where it is not 
“facially discriminatory,”95 so long as it is discriminatory in “practical effect.”96 
 
 88.  See generally Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1795–801 (identifying, and then systematically 
responding to, the various arguments of both the Dissent and the State of Maryland). 
 89.  See infra Section III.b.i.1. 
 90.  See infra Section III.b.i.2. 
 91.  See infra Section III.b.ii.1. 
 92.  See infra Section III.b.ii.2. 
 93.  Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1804.  The State specifically delineates three categories of income: 
“(1) residents who earn income in State, (2) residents who earn income out of State, and (3) nonresidents who 
earn income in State.” Id.  For the purposes of the Wynne Court’s analysis, the two-part distinction between out-
of-state versus instate, suffices.  Id. at 1804–05 (persisting that these aesthetic categorizations, do nothing to “save 
[the tax] from invalidation.”). 
 94.  See supra text accompanying notes 82–83. 
 95.  Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1805 (quoting American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 
266, 281 (1987)). 
 96.  See id. (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979)) (giving example to different ways in 
which a law may be discriminatory, and not offering ways in which a law is permitted to be discriminatory). 
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2.  The Corporation Versus Resident Distinction  
The taxpayers in Storen,97 Henneford,98 and Mealey99 were all corporations whereas the 
Wynnes are individual residents.100  The State attempted to paint the Wynnes’ claim 
as unwarranted because income earned by an individual deserves fewer protections 
under the Commerce Clause, than does income earned by a corporation.101  The basis 
for this argument is two-fold: (1) that a tax on the individual is more justified due to 
individuals “reap[ing] the benefits of local roads, local police and fire protection . . . 
;”102 and (2) that an individual’s right to vote is a sufficient protection from unfair 
taxing – a protection not afforded to corporations.103 
The Court in Wynne rejected the State’s first premise, pointing out that state 
infrastructure like roads are the same driven by corporate trucks; and state services 
like police and fire departments are the same services corporations call on to protect 
their facilities.104  The Court also dismissed the State’s second premise related to a 
corporation’s lack of voting power by noting prior decisions where a challenge to 
legislation was sustained notwithstanding the party having had the right to cast a vote 
on the challenged legislation.105  Again relying on practical considerations, the Court 
reinforced its position by questioning the result if the State’s argument were to prevail 
in a case where the victim of the discriminatory tax held a minority view in the voting 
population.106 
 
 97.  See J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 308 (1938) (naming the appellant taxpayer as a 
manufacturing business incorporated in Indiana). 
 98.  See Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 435 (1939) (identifying the appellant 
taxpayer as a fruit distribution business incorporated in Washington state). 
 99.  See Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 665 (1948) (Murphy, J., dissenting) 
(classifying the appellant taxpayer as a New York corporation).  The dissent is referenced here simply because it 
offered the most explicit reference to the appellant taxpayer, as indeed a New York corporation, but this was not 
a disputed issue – so much so that the majority seemingly did not find it necessary to designate the appellant 
taxpayer as such in its opinion.  
 100.  Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1793. 
 101.  Id. at 1797. 
 102.  See id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 30, Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015) 
(No. 13-485)). 
 103.  Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1797; cf. Zelinksy, supra note 23 (asserting that the inequity of taxing 
non-residents or statutory residents who do not have a political voice in the state from which they’re being taxed, 
does not apply to the Wynnes because they’re able to vote in Maryland).  
 104.  Id.  The Court also gave examples of ways in which corporations benefit from state services that may 
more exclusively be thought of as an individual resource.  See id. (suggesting that schools or any other government 
service, is relied on by the corporation to serve and better their employees, while also attracting employees to their 
place of business). 
 105.  Id. at 1793. 
 106.  Id. at 1798. 
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ii.  The Dissents 
1.  Net Income vs. Gross Receipts Income 
In Storen, Henneford, and Mealey the challenged tax was assessed on the taxpayers’ 
“gross receipts,” as opposed to net income.107  The dissent in Wynne sought to 
capitalize on this nuance, relying on a 2003 tax treatise to conclude that, historically, 
there’s been a distinction in taxing the two forms of earnings.108  However, the 
majority quickly dismissed this distinction as irrelevant, pointing to the dissent’s own 
acknowledgment that more recent precedent has rejected this distinction.109  Utilizing 
the same treatise offered by the dissent, the majority stressed that this distinction 
would, “allow[] very little . . . trustworthy guidance as to tax validity.”110  As the 
majority described, “the gross receipts judicial pendulum has swung in wide arc, . . . 
now squarely reject[ing] the argument that the Commerce Clause distinguishes 
between taxes on net and gross income.”111 
2.  Sovereign Tax Authority Trumps Commerce Clause Limitations 
After attempting to distinguish the cases of Storen, Henneford, and Mealey from the 
facts in Wynne, the dissent then argued that the State’s sovereign tax authority was 
the appropriate precedent to apply.112  The dissent relied on the premise that the 
states’ tax authority is absolute, and that it applied to “all the income of its residents, 
even income earned outside the taxing jurisdiction.”113   
Although the sovereign tax authority may be constitutional standing on its own, 
it is preempted like much of state authority when the exercise of that authority 
unjustly infringes on an individual’s constitutional rights.114  The dissent looked past 
this preemption limitation.  As the Wynne Court stated, despite states’ clear authority 
 
 107.  See Storen, 304 U.S. at 309 (acknowledging that the State tax was applied to income from appellant’s 
gross income from sales); Henneford, 305 U.S. at 435 (specifying the Washington statute called for the tax of the 
“gross income of the business”); Mealey, 334 U.S. at 664 (framing the issue of the case as a State tax law that 
imposed on gross receipts).  
 108.  Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1820 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing CHARLES A. TROST & PAUL J. 
HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 251 (Thomson Reuters ed., 2d ed. 2003) 
[hereinafter TROST & HARTMAN]). 
 109.  Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1795–96.   
 110.  See id. at 1796 (quoting TROST & HARTMAN at 212) (discussing the use of direct and indirect burden 
tests in considering commerce clause violations as they apply to tax schemes).  The Court goes on to explain that 
because this formal distinction does not create valuable guidance, controlling cases like Storen or Henneford, rely 
instead on an economic impact analysis – in this scenario, a threat of multiple taxation.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 1796 (citing Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct.  1331, 1335 (1995)). 
 112.  Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1798. 
 113.  Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).  
 114.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protecting citizens from unreasonable search and seizure); U.S. CONST. 
amend. VII (ensuring a defendant’s right to a speedy and public trial). 
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to tax, “[the] imposition of th[at] tax may nonetheless violate the Commerce 
Clause.”115 
To further illustrate this preemption limit, the majority in Wynne looked to Camps 
Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison,116 where the Court sustained a challenge 
from a Maine corporation to a Maine tax law.117  In describing Camps Newfound, the 
Wynne Court conceded that there was “no question” of Maine’s jurisdictional 
authority to tax the plaintiff.118  The Court qualified, however, simply that “a state has 
the jurisdictional power to impose a tax says nothing about whether that tax violates 
the Commerce Clause.”119  Like in Camps Newfound, where Maine’s tax failed the 
scrutiny of Commerce Clause precedent, Maryland’s tax scheme similarly failed.120  
Thus, the Court referenced Camps Newfound to further accentuate that, “Maryland’s 
raw power to tax its residents . . . does not insulate its tax scheme from scrutiny under 
the [D]ormant Commerce Clause.”121  The dissent failed to reconcile this point.  
c.  Wynne is a Sound, Defensible Opinion 
The Wynne decision recasts the constitutional markers for applying the Dormant 
Commerce Clause to tax codes.  Subsequently, the decision places a burden on states 
to alter course as they navigate the limitations on State tax authority, while also 
seeking to keep State tax revenue afloat.  The Court in Wynne was considerate of this 
burden. 122   
Justice Alito carefully weaved the Court’s practical effect emphasis into the 
majority opinion of Wynne.123  The opinion methodically answered the pertinent 
arguments raised by the opposition and went as far as acknowledging an alternative 
solution to address the alleged friction between the Commerce Clause and the 
sovereign jurisdictional tax power.124  This consideration protected the opinion from 
the oppositions’ cries of an unreasonable burden placed on the states left to adapt 
 
 115.  Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1798 (citing Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992) 
(rejecting a due process challenge before sustaining a commerce clause challenge to the same tax)). 
 116.  Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997). 
 117.  Id. at 569. 
 118.  Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1799 (deeming the plaintiff’s incorporation in Maine as an obvious 
qualifier for the State’s tax authority).  Maryland’s authority to tax the Wynnes would be just as clear as Maine’s, 
given the Wynnes’ residency in Maryland. 
 119.  Id.  
 120.  Id. (citing Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 580–83). 
 121.  Id. at 1799. 
 122.  See infra notes 123–26 and accompanying text. 
 123.  See supra Part III. 
 124.  Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1806 (offering contemporary tax code examples that would cure the 
constitutional defects of the Maryland code, without requiring a major overhaul of the code at whole); see supra 
Section III.b. 
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their tax code to the ruling.125  This decision will necessitate substantial reform of 
some states’ current tax policies and, in some cases, may prompt states to make other 
budgetary adjustments to account for lost revenue.  However, by paying attention to 
the opposing arguments and recognizing existing policy for compliance, Justice 
Alito’s opinion in Wynne is sound.126 
IV.  FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 
In the wake of this decision, states with noncompliant tax codes will be left to find a 
balance between sustaining necessary tax revenues and complying with this ruling.127 
Maryland, albeit without any meaningful guidepost, stumbled out of the gate in its 
effort to find that balance.  Although Maryland’s failure will subject it to further 
Constitutional challenges, it should also serve as a guide for other states seeking to 
avoid similarly self-inflicted wounds.128 The following sections will offer insight into 
the impact of Wynne both in Maryland and nationwide.  These sections will look at 
how Maryland’s legislative history, along with relevant constitutional precedent, will 
both influence future litigation aimed at exploiting Maryland’s flawed response to 
this matter. 
a.  Wynne’s Impact on Maryland and Beyond 
A universally relatable measurement for “impact” is, of course, monetary cost. 
Consequently, cost is a logical framework to illustrate this ruling’s tangible effect on 
Maryland, as well as across the nation.  Maryland preemptively estimated the ruling’s 
cost to the State, in refund payments alone, to be $190 million before interest.129  In 
addition, the State’s annual revenue loss has been estimated at $42 million.130  Even 
more alarming is the cost to counties who will ultimately have to reimburse the state 
 
 125.  See generally id. at 1813–20 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 126.  Although the Justice’s opinion is sound, this does not preclude it from substantial debate and 
disagreement.  As is the case with most 5-4 opinions of the Supreme Court, many have and will continue to 
disagree with this opinion. 
 127.  See infra notes 133–134 and accompanying text (naming other jurisdictions who are likely to face similar 
challenges to their own tax law, which is reflective of Maryland’s unconstitutional scheme). 
 128.  Maryland may have learned from its own failures. A Senate bill was introduced in Maryland in early 
2016, aimed at repealing the 2014 reduction of interest rates on Wynne refunds. S.B. 1024, 2016 Leg., (Md. 2016).  
However, despite the bill being introduced on February 17, 2016, it did not make it beyond a first reading. Id. 
 129.  Letter from Att’y Gen. to Governor, supra note 6, at 10; see Turque, supra note 7 (estimating Maryland’s 
cost to top $200 million). 
 130.  Brent Kendall, Supreme Court Strikes Down Maryland’s Double Taxation of Residents, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL, May 18, 2015. 
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for any tax refunds.131  Certain counties in Maryland have estimated revenue losses as 
high as $55 million annually.132 
The national scope of this ruling comes into focus when considering other states 
and localities that employ tax provisions like the ones invalidated by the Wynne 
decision.  An amicus brief submitted to the Wynne Court listed, by way of example, 
Wisconsin, North Carolina, and Tennessee all as states implicated by the Wynne 
ruling.133  The brief went on to list the cities of Philadelphia, Cleveland, Detroit, 
Kansas City, St. Louis, and New York as similarly implicated.134  Maybe the most 
startling inclusion on this list is New York City, considering the sheer volume of its 
resident’s income and the proportionate ratio of that income which involves 
interstate sources.  
Finally, a cost that is more difficult to conceptualize is the looming legal and 
administrative costs that will follow this decision.  The extent of refunds to be filed 
as a result of Wynne is not yet known, but simply claiming and processing these 
refunds will carry a substantial cost.135  Costs surrounding the inevitable litigation that 
will arise are even more difficult to calculate.136  Even in the infancy of the Wynne 
doctrine, claims have started to appear in Maryland137 and elsewhere.138  The success 
of these suits may give way to a new feeding ground for tax attorneys across the 
nation, leaving Maryland and other similarly implicated states with an ultimate cost 
that is currently immeasurable.   
 
 131.  DePaul, supra note 7. 
 132.  Aaron Kraut, U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Tax Case Could Cost Montgomery County Millions, 
BETHESDA MAGAZINE, May 18, 2015. 
 133.  See Brief for Int’l Mun. Lawyers Assoc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Comptroller of 
the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015) (No. 13-485) at 17–18 (analogizing these states to Maryland on 
the basis that they too do not provide a credit to account for the resident tax on out-of-state income). 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  See generally Sawyer, supra note 10 (discussing a backlog of thousands of claims, increasing in number 
and cost, daily).  
 136.  See DePaul, supra note 7 (raising various prospective litigation claims related to the refunds).  
 137.  Amended Class Action Complaint, Holzheid v. Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland, Case No. 24-
C-15-005700, 1, 13–16 (Balt. City Cir. Ct. Dec. 10, 2015), (No.5/0) (asserting a class action suit against Maryland 
for, among other things, Commerce Clause violations and takings clause violations).  The plaintiffs also seek an 
injunction preventing the State from applying its 2014 legislation which reduced interest rates for Wynne refunds, 
and asks for declaratory relief finding the legislation unconstitutional. Id. at 17.  Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 
was denied on February 18, 2016 and trial is scheduled for December 16, 2016.  See generally Amy Hamilton, 
Maryland Acknowledges Class Action Related to Wynne Refunds, 79 STATE TAX NOTES 8, Jan. 4, 2016 (giving a 
general background on Maryland’s retroactive adjustment as it relates to potential class participants). 
 138.  See generally Knoll & Mason, supra note 11 (reporting on the Massachusetts highest Court’s 
consideration of a remand case to apply the Supreme Court’s Wynne ruling in determining whether a State tax is 
discriminatory).  As of the publication of this comment, the Wynne case has been cited in nine federal court cases, 
including cases from the First, Second, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, as well as in six state court cases, including 
Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, and Utah. See, e.g., Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 
1129 (2016); Merscorp Holdings, Inc. v. Malloy, 13 A.3d 220 (Conn. 2016). 
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The following sections will demonstrate why Maryland will likely lose the fight 
over the constitutionality of its Wynne response.  To give context to this new 
litigation, this section will first identify the key components of Maryland’s legislative 
response to the Wynne ruling as well as useful background to that legislation.  This 
section will then provide an overview of the constitutional precedent that forms the 
basis for these new constitutional challenges to Maryland’s response. 
b.  The History of Maryland’s Tax Refund and Deficiency Interest Rates 
Maryland’s response to Wynne must be viewed not only in the perspective of the 
existing legislation it amended, but also with an eye to the State’s reasoning for 
making the change.  In Maryland, prior to 2007, interest rates were different for 
returns paid by the State and deficiency assessments paid by the taxpayer.139  When 
the taxpayer owed the State, the taxpayer would be charged thirteen percent 
interest.140  However, when the State owed the taxpayer, the State only charged itself 
four percent interest.141  This inconsistency was corrected in 2007, when the rate was 
equalized to at least thirteen percent interest for both refund payments to the 
taxpayer and deficiency payments to the State.142  This rate remained consistent for 
deficiencies and refunds until 2014.143  In expectation of an adverse ruling from the 
Supreme Court in Wynne,144 the State again amended legislation in May of 2014 
reducing the interest rate the State would owe on any refund resulting from Wynne.  
The rate was reduced to roughly four percent, while the rate taxpayers owed the stated 
remained at thirteen percent, nearly resetting the discrepancy the State had corrected 
in 2007.145  The reduced rate applied exclusively to any refunds the State would owe 
 
 139.  Office of the Comptroller, Interest and Penalty Charges Announcement – Interest Rates, 
http://taxes.marylandtaxes.com/Individual_Taxes/Individual_Tax_Types/Estate_and_Inheritance_Tax/Paymen
t_Information/Interest_and_Penalty_Charges.shtml [hereinafter Maryland Comptroller’s Interest Rate 
Announcement]. 
 140.  Id. The discrepancy between rates charged against taxpayers and those charged against the State, favored 
the State by as much as 9% in 2005, equating to more than a three times higher interest cost for taxpayers than 
the State. Id. 
 141.  See id. (showing the interest rate the State charges itself had decreased to 4% in 2006 from as high as 8% 
in 2001). 
 142.  See H.B. 1345, 107th Cong., §1 (Md. 2007) (applying the same interest rate calculation to both tax 
deficiencies and refunds). 
 143.  See Maryland Comptroller’s Interest Rate Announcement. 
 144.  Letter from Att’y Gen. to Governor, supra note 6, at 10 (taking note of the “strength” of the Court of 
Appeals decision). 
 145.  See S.B. 172, 114th Cong., §§ 16, 20 (Md. 2014) (amending the thirteen percent rate set by the 2007 
legislation, to a “percent that equals the average prime rate of interest quotes by commercial banks”).  Often 
generalized, the term “prime interest rate,” represents an average of the rates at which large institution banks lend 
money to each other.  See Wall Street Journal Prime Rate, BANKRATE.COM (last visited Nov. 8, 2016).  The Wall 
Street Journal prime rate, currently at 3.5%, is calculated by averaging a daily survey of the prime rates offered by 
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specifically from the Wynne decision.146  The Wynne decision was not rendered until 
May 18, 2015.147 
c.  Constitutional Background for New Challenges to Maryland Tax Law 
While arguably a new frontier of tax litigation, challenges to Maryland’s legislative 
response will reinvigorate Constitutional doctrine whose debates initiated centuries 
ago.  First is the narrow and rarely applied doctrine prohibiting prescriptive 
legislation from limiting a judicial decision.  Second is the embattled doctrine of the 
Constitution’s takings clause.  This section offers useful background to the cases that 
make up these areas of law, and will serve as an important framework for analyzing 
litigation over Maryland’s Wynne response.148 
i.  Klein’s Guidance on “Rules of Decision” Creating Prescriptive legislation 
United States v. Klein,149 in its most basic form, was a dispute over property rights in 
cotton seized by the United States during the civil war pursuant to a congressional 
enactment which made property in the insurrectionary territory subject to 
confiscation without compensation.150  Seemingly just a property dispute in origin, 
the ultimate decision in Klein established significant markers for the separation of 
powers between the legislative and judicial branches. 
Beginning on July 13, 1861, Congress passed various acts which subjected persons 
(and more directly their property) to seizure and forfeiture for even loose association 
with insurrectionist territory or motives.151   However, the last installment of this 
three-part legislative initiative, enacted on July 17, 1862, included authorization for 
the President to pardon, and in turn restore property rights to, persons having been 
associated with, or having had property seized in the insurrectionist territories.152  
Through a subsequent proclamation on December 8, 1863, the President offered a 
full pardon, with full restoration of property, contingent upon the person taking an 
 
the thirty largest banks.  Id.  The Wall Street Journal’s prime rate average “is the most widely quoted measure of 
the prime rate.” Id. 
 146.  S.B. 172, 114th Cong., § 16 (Md. 2014); see also Letter from Att’y Gen. to Governor, supra note 6, at 9 
(specifying that the provision applies to other taxpayers who may file refund claims as a result of the Wynne ruling 
and are “successful on their claims”). 
 147.  Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015). 
 148.  See infra Sections IV.d.ii–iii. 
 149.  United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). 
 150.  Id. at 128. 
 151.  Id. at 130.  This legislative span consisted of three separate acts, passed on July 13, 1861, August 6, 1861, 
and July 17, 1862, respectively.  Id. 
 152.  Id. at 131. 
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oath of allegiance to the Union.153  The claimant in Klein154 sought to be compensated 
for seized property pursuant to such a pardon and was granted his request by the 
Federal Court of Claims.155  The Federal Government appealed the Court of Claims 
judgment, but the Supreme Court affirmed the decision.156   
The Klein case returned to the Supreme Court by way of a motion from the United 
States Attorney General, requesting that the Court dismiss its prior decision.157  The 
motion cited a congressional proviso passed in the same year, which in relevant part 
enumerated, “no pardon . . . shall be admissible in evidence on the part of any 
claimant in the Court of Claims as evidence in support of any claim against the 
United States.”158  The proviso went further to mandate that should any such pardon 
be offered into evidence, it should not be “used or considered by said court, or by 
[an] appellate court.”159 
In considering the Federal Government’s appeal, the Klein Court looked to United 
States v. Padelford,160 a case decided prior to the congressional proviso.161  In Padelford 
the Supreme Court affirmed a decision that granted an award in favor of a pardoned 
person.162  The Klein Court recognized that its decision in Padelford was an 
acknowledgement of its duty to indeed consider these pardons as evidence.163  This 
new proviso, the Court decided, “den[ied] pardons . . . the effect which th[e] [C]ourt” 
in Padelford “had adjudged them to have.”164  Additionally, the Court found that the 
prospective nature of the proviso sought to manipulate the absolute rights and 
obligations due to citizens from their government.165  The proviso transformed those 
 
 153.  Id. at 131–32. 
 154.  See id. at 132 (clarifying that Klein had standing as an administrator to the affairs of V. F. Wilson, who 
died in 1865).  Wilson’s property had been seized for his aiding rebellion soldiers during the Civil War.  Id. Wilson 
was pardoned prior to his death, pursuant to an oath of allegiance he took on February 15, 1864.  Id. 
 155.  Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 132–33.  This grant was decided on May 26, 1869 despite it being filed by 
Klein in December of 1865.  Id.  The award was significant, totaling $125,300. Today that figure would translate 
to roughly $2.1 million. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. at 134. 
 158.  Id. at 133. 
 159.  Id. The proviso, as written, based its invalidation of the pardon on the fact that such a pardon would 
offer conclusive evidence of a prior infidelity to the Union and thereby should “summarily” cease the Court’s 
jurisdiction over the claim.  Id. In effect, the proviso renders the pardon moot, for the very issue the pardon was 
enacted to address, i.e., prior association with the rebellion. Supra notes 153–56.  This comment fully explores 
the legal short-comings of this enactment, but the question is begged of how a piece of legislation as circular, and 
as ill-constructed as this proviso, survived all the way to a court of decision before meeting a fatal judgment. 
 160.  United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. 531 (1869). 
 161.  United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, passim (1871) (referencing Padelford, 76 U.S. at 531). 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145. 
 164.  Id. at 145. 
 165.  Id. at 146. 
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rights and obligations from absolute to selective, permitting the government to 
recognize its duty only when certain circumstances were triggered.166  The Court 
soundly rejected this notion of selective legislation, claiming “it is as much the duty 
of the government as of individuals to fulfil[l] its obligations,”167 and that in passing 
such a proviso, “Congress ha[d] . . . passed the limit which separates the legislative 
from the judicial power.”168 
The Klein decision offers two key takeaways for the constitutional boundaries of 
the separate branch powers.  First, that it is unconstitutional for the legislature to 
prescribe a “rule of decision” for a judicial ruling;169 and second, that new legislation 
cannot be created to retroactively absolve the State of existing obligations.170  As will 
be discussed in further detail below, Maryland’s legislative response to the Wynne 
decision is impermissibly congruent with the congressional proviso forbidden in 
Klein.171 
ii.  Takings Clause Doctrine: Confounding Precedent 
For nearly 150 years the Supreme Court has consistently ushered takings clause cases 
into its crowded docket. Yet as this precedent grows, each new opinion seems to only 
further confound efforts to predict a court’s application of the resulting doctrine.172  
While some literature has made inroads to organizing the courts’ consideration of 
these matters, as this section will discuss further below,173 even today a compensable 
takings claim is inherently uncertain legal footing.174  Nonetheless, exploring this 
 
 166.  In this context that transformation, from absolute to selective, was triggered when the pardon in 
question was being considered by a Court of Claims.  Id. at 134 (including the proviso language that explicitly 
lays out criteria for when the absolute rights are ignored). 
 167.  Id. at 144. 
 168.  Id. at 147. 
 169.  Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146 (invoking a court’s duty to “ascertain [for itself] certain facts and 
thereupon to declare that its jurisdiction on appeal has ceased”). The Court then concluded that relying on the 
Congressional proviso, as an instruction for where the court’s jurisdiction starts and stops, would be nothing 
more than the Court acquiescing to an order from Congress to rule “in a particular way”).  Id. 
 170.  Id. at 142. 
 171.  See Infra Section IV.d.ii.   
 172.  See generally Meltz, supra note 8 (offering a chronology of the continual development of taking clause 
precedent from Supreme Court decisions covering the infamous 1870 case of Hepburn v. Griswold, one of the first 
hallmark cases to takings clause doctrine, to contentious Supreme Court decisions in 2005 which left the 
constitutional debate very much alive).  The continued uncertainty over how courts decide takings cases, is further 
evidenced by the fact that since 1978 “more than 50 takings cases have been decided by the Supreme Court.” Id.   
 173.  See infra note 176. 
 174. Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles – Part I – A Critique of Current 
Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1301, 1316 (1989) (“It is difficult to discern from the Court’s takings 
decision which test the Court would apply in any given case.  Moreover, whichever test is used, there is 
considerable uncertainty as to what each test means.”).  But see id. at 1342 (reconciling this inconsistency and lack 
of guidance with a “underlying pattern” based in the Justices’ reliance on a sense of “when fairness requires the 
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argument is a useful exercise in the Wynne context given the likelihood that plaintiffs 
to subsequent Wynne refund litigation will claim the value of lost interest from 
refund payments as compensable property. 
The Supreme Court’s takings doctrine can generally be divided into three “eras” 
of precedent, each set apart by a marked shift in courts’ general approach to the 
issue.175  The most recent of these shifts, prompted by the Supreme Court’s 1978 
decision in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York,176 has seen courts focus 
predominantly on three key factors in a takings determination: (1) the “character” of 
the government action, (2) the extent to which it interferes with distinct investment-
backed expectations, and (3) the economic impact of the action.177  In keeping with 
the tradition for confusion surrounding this doctrine, the Supreme Court has not 
given a definitive answer as to whether any of these factors are independently 
dispositive.178  Even worse, the courts’ interpretation of each factor itself has been 
marred with inconsistencies.179 
Under the first analysis prong, “character of the governmental action,” courts have 
looked at whether the government physically takes or invades property, focusing 
particularly on the “serious” or “permanent” nature of the action.180  As a result, 
courts have been more likely to find a taking where it is of an “unusually serious 
 
payment of compensation”).  Despite Peterson’s efforts, the reconciliation of a “sense of fairness” presumably 
does little to assuage the confusion of lower court judges, and practitioners alike, left to navigate the murky waters 
of this Supreme Court precedent.  As will be articulated further in the text of this comment, these “murky waters” 
are decidedly less so in the context of “per se” takings. 
 175.  See Meltz, supra note 8, at 16 (deeming the period from 1870 to 1922 as the era of “appropriations and 
physical takings only,” where the Supreme Court’s precedent on the constitutional takings clause took form 
through the Court’s recognition that the clause went beyond just limiting the government’s formal exercise of its 
eminent domain power and extended to more indirect government conduct); see also id. at 11 (categorizing the 
period from 1922 to 1978 as the “dawn of regulatory takings law” where the Court recognized that a government 
taking extends even to mere government regulation of property use); id. (discussing the most expansive era of 
constitutional takings clause doctrine which is still developing today and was, initiated by a Supreme Court 
decision in 1978). 
 176.  438 U.S. 104 (1978); see Peterson, supra note 174, at 1317 (describing the three-factor test from Penn 
Central, as the “primary test” used to determine whether a taking has occurred).  As Peterson points out, the 
Court had grown wary of its “ad hoc, factual inquiries” in prior decisions and through Penn Central sought to 
provide more “structure for future inquiries by identifying three factors it considered particularly significant in 
determining whether governmental action constituted a taking.” Id. 
 177.  Meltz, supra note 8, at 3. But see Peterson, supra note 174, at 1316 (hinting at the unpredictability of 
courts, Peterson acknowledged that aside from the Penn Central test, courts have applied three other modern 
tests, albeit on a more limited basis). 
 178.  Peterson, supra note 174, at 1317, 1320, 1326. 
 179.  Id. at 1316 (“It is difficult to discern . . . which test the Court would apply in any given case.  Moreover, 
whichever test is used, there is considerable uncertainty as to what each tests means.”); see, e.g., id. at Section 
IV.c.ii (laying out the various applications of each prong of the Penn Central test).  
 180.  Id. at 1317–18. 
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nature.”181  Where the matter at hand has not involved a physical taking, courts’ 
analysis of this prong has shifted to focus on the government’s justification.182 
In the second prong of analysis, “interfere[nce] with the claimant’s reasonable, 
investment-backed expectations,” courts have usually asked whether the claimant 
“reasonably relied to [their] economic detriment on an expectation that the 
government would not act as it did.”183  This expectation has mostly failed where 
courts have deemed the government action to be foreseeable.184  Courts have found 
foreseeability in a variety of circumstances, for example, where the claimant was 
effectively “on notice” that the action may occur,185 where changes in the law were 
“foreseeable given the history of regulation in [an] industry,”186 or where the 
government reserved the power to change the law.187  However, courts have been 
“likely to find that reasonable expectations were disappointed [] when the 
government has broken a promise . . . for example . . . [where] the law had ‘explicitly 
guaranteed[,]’” something.188  Under similar “broken promise” reasoning, courts 
have “equate[d] reasonable, investment-backed expectations with ‘property,’” 
referring to the expectation as a “vested right.”189 
Courts have differed in their consideration of the third analysis prong, “economic 
impact of the governmental action.”190 Some have required a showing of “greatly 
diminished [] value of the claimant’s tangible thing,” whereas other courts have 
considered the “economically viable use” that remains.191  In instances where only the 
diminution of value is required, courts have generally not focused on the static loss 
in dollars, but rather on the proportion of the original value.192 
d.  Maryland’s Flawed Response to the Wynne Decision  
Maryland’s legislative response to Wynne will fail because it ignores constitutional 
doctrine and oversteps State authority.  The legislative amendment subjects 
 
 181.  Id. at 1318. 
 182.  Id. at 1319 (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987)). 
 183.  Id. at 1320; see also id. at 1321 (defining “investment backed” as a scenario where the claimant “parted 
with something of economic value in reliance on an expectation that the government would not act in a particular 
manner”). 
 184.  Peterson, supra note 174, at 1320. 
 185.  Id. (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984)). 
 186.  Id. (citing Connolly v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986)). 
 187.  See id. at 1321 (indicating that the reservation could be either implied or explicit). 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. at 1323. 
 190.  Peterson, supra note 174, at 1325. 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Id. at 1325–26. 
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Maryland taxpayers to the mercy of the State’s self-proclaimed “grace”193 in 
determining interest rates for Wynne refunds.  However, because this “grace” was not 
exercised uniformly, it creates an unfair burden on interstate commerce, not to 
mention on Maryland taxpayers.  Even putting aside this unfair burden, the provision 
limits a judicial ruling in a way that exceeds the State’s authority.  For these reasons 
the State’s exercised “grace” is constitutionally impermissible. 
i.  Legislative Impropriety 
Maryland’s legislative amendment in 2007 simplified the calculation of tax interest 
rates to eliminate a complex formula that over time had lost its utility.194  Generally, 
deference should be given to the State’s discretion in tax policy decisions – so long as 
the application of that discretion is uniform.195  The 2014 legislation, expressly 
purposed as a move to shrink payments the State would owe for prior 
unconstitutional tax calculations,196 does not apply that discretion uniformly.197  
Instead, it selects a specific class of State residents particularly wronged by the State’s 
tax code, and particularly positioned to seek repayments from the State, and it 
retroactively reduces the State’s obligation to these residents.198 
This action on its face questions the good faith in which the State administered its 
taxing authority, but more directly it is an affront to the State’s obligations to its 
residents – obligations that have been shown to be constitutionally protected.199 
ii.  Klein Prohibits Maryland’s Retroactive Adjustment of Wynne Refunds 
Maryland’s adjustment of the refund rate, specifically for refunds expected from the 
Wynne decision, mirrors the prohibited conduct in Klein and thus should be similarly 
banned.200  The legislative proviso in Klein adjusted the effect of pardons specific to 
 
 193.  Letter from Att’y Gen. to Governor, supra note 6, at 9 (citation omitted) (characterizing the determination 
of interest paid on tax refunds, as “a matter of grace which can only be authorized by legislative enactment”). 
 194.  See supra Section IV.b; H.B. 1345, 107TH Cong., §1 (Md. 2007); see also FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, H.B. 
1345, MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY (2007) at 2 (explaining existing calculations choose the greater of 13% or a 
3% markup of the average prime banking rate).  While the 3% markup may have been appropriate at the time of 
the original legislative enactment, as rates began to change, the calculated average even with the markup became 
more and more disproportionate. Id. 
 195.  Supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text. 
 196.  Letter from Att’y Gen. to Governor, supra note 6, at 9–10. 
 197.  Supra notes 139–46 and accompanying text. 
 198.  Supra notes 139–46 and accompanying text. 
 199.  See supra Part II; infra Section IV.d.ii.  
 200.  Compare 2014 Md. Laws 2962, 3002 (applying exclusively to Wynne refunds and limiting any 
prospective judicial ruling that finds a refund to be due by eliminating the taxpayer’s entitlement to a portion of 
the interest due on the refund), with United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 134, 142 (1871) (applying 
exclusively to claims related to the pardon declaration and denying pardoned claimants a vested right to restored 
property). 
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Federal Court of Claims cases.  Maryland’s legislative amendment in response to 
Wynne adjusts the applicable rate specific to refunds stemming from the Wynne 
case.201  In Wynne, like in Klein, this adjustment creates an unfair benefit for the 
government.  What is worse is that the benefit comes at the cost of taxpayers, to an 
extent that is constitutionally impermissible. 
As the Court stated in Klein, a government, just like an individual, has a “duty . . . 
to fulfil[l] its obligations.”202  Addressing the context of presidential pardons, the 
Court emphasized that where “conditions [have] been satisfied, the pardon and its 
connected promises took full effect.”203  Though a different context, this same trigger 
applies to Maryland’s legislative enactment.  Once the “condition is satisfied,” which 
in Wynne was the Government’s over-taxation, then the “promises [take] full effect.”  
For the Wynnes, that promise was a refund payment with interest at the rate 
legislatively required – not a new rate conveniently chosen to please the State.   
The State’s action in 2014 was designed to soften any ruling adverse to the State, 
that the Supreme Court would make in its 2015 decision, through the caveat that the 
State would choose the interest rate to charge itself for any payments it owes.  The 
Court made no such condition in its ruling.204  Effectively, Maryland’s response would 
require any court hearing disputes over Wynne refunds to read in a caveat to the 
Wynne ruling that simply does not exist.  This is no different than when the 
Government sought to render the Padelford decision moot to the Klein Court.205  
Maryland’s legislative amendment limits the amount of any prospective refund that 
any court may find to be due pursuant to Wynne.  Thus, like in Klein, through this 
enactment the State “den[ied] . . . the effect which this [C]ourt had adjudged” its 
Wynne opinion to have.206   
Had the State chosen to alter interest rates uniformly, the State likely would have 
been within its taxing authority (though such an enactment would undoubtedly have 
faced more resistance in political arenas).207  Maryland’s amendment is not simply a 
change in the law, which would be more likely to survive the Klein standard.  Instead 
 
 201.  See supra Section IV.d. 
 202.  Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 144. 
 203.  Id. at 142. 
 204.  See generally Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015). 
 205.  See supra Section IV.c.i (presenting Klein’s conclusion that Congress’s proactive proviso forced the 
Court to ignore its precedent of finding presidential pardons to be admissible evidence).  This reality would be 
the same for a Court reviewing a Wynne tax refund claim, as the legislature has effectively said that where specific 
Wynne claims are raised, the Court may only grant a reduced refund, rather than the full refund found to be 
warranted by Wynne. See generally Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (offering no qualification for a reduced 
interest rate on the owed refund). 
 206.  Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145. 
 207.  Cf. Sager, supra note 8, at 2527 (pointing out the Supreme Court case of Robertson v. Seattle Audobon 
Society, which found a challenged legislative act not to be in conflict with Klein because the enactment was a 
change of applicable law, and not simply a directive altering the application of an existing law). 
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it is a directive on how to apply the Wynne refunds specifically.208  It is clear that the 
purpose of the legislation was to curtail only the results of the Wynne decision in 
hopes of softening the blow of any ruling adverse to the State.209  This is no different 
than the congressional proviso of 1870, where the enactment was drafted “largely in 
reaction to the Padelford decision,” as “Congress sought a means by which to defeat 
such claims.”210  Thus, Maryland’s decision to focus the legislation specifically on tax 
refunds stemming from a prospective judicial ruling went beyond its taxing authority 
and infringed on the judicial power. 
iii.  Wynne Refunds Constitute Compensable Takings If They Don’t Include the 
Originally Enumerated Interest Rate 
Judicial decisions on takings clause challenges, while prolific, have been anything but 
consistent.211  Notwithstanding this uncertainty, citizens who are eligible for Wynne 
refunds can make a compelling argument that the denial of owed interest by 
Maryland’s legislation constitutes a compensable taking.  Thus, even without finding 
Maryland’s response unconstitutional under Klein, courts may still hold the State 
liable for a compensable taking.   
Prior to applying each prong of the Penn Central test to Wynne refunds, there are 
two preliminary matters that must be addressed.  First, as a point of clarification, it 
is not a refund itself that would be the subject of a takings claim here, but rather the 
portion of the owed interest not paid because of the interest rate reduction.212  Second, 
the State may argue that the interest paid on a refund does not constitute property 
and instead is only a prospective benefit.  In turn, the State could then argue that it 
did not take away that benefit, but rather only revoked the privilege to receive it.  This 
line of reasoning is favorable for the State as courts have been less likely to find a 
taking where the government action merely “adjust[s] the benefits [or burdens of 
economic life.”213  However, an equally compelling argument is that a Wynne 
claimant need not have physical possession of the owed interest payment for a 
compensable taking to have occurred.214  Courts have accepted this argument because 
 
 208.  Id. 
 209.  Letter from Att’y Gen. to Governor, supra note 6, at 9–10. 
 210.  AMANDA L. TYLER, THE STORY OF KLEIN: THE SCOPE OF CONGRESS’S AUTHORITY TO SHAPE THE 
JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 94 (Foundation Press ed., 2d ed. 2009).  
 211.  See discussion supra Section IV.c.ii. 
 212.  This portion is the difference between the originally enumerated 13% value of the refund, and the 
retroactively reduced 3.5% value of the refund, see supra Section IV.b, that constitutes the State’s taking of a 
property interest that the citizen was entitled to receive.  This is particularly important in the context of the third 
prong of the Penn Central test, which considers the economic impact of the action. 
 213.  Peterson, supra note 174, at 1357. 
 214.  Id. at 1323. 
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the claimants’ right to that payment is already vested and thus, whether the claimant 
ever physically possessed the property or took action on the right is immaterial.215   
Under the first prong of the Penn Central test, considering the “character of 
government action,” courts are most likely to find a compensable taking to exist when 
the government physically takes or invades property.216  In the context of a Wynne 
refund, the Government is arguably withholding a portion of the refund owed to the 
taxpayer, or put another way, the taxpayer is losing out on a refund they are entitled 
to.  However, even if a court were unwilling to find this “physical taking,” that would 
not preclude a successful takings claim.  Because a “physical taking” is only more likely 
to satisfy the “character of government action” prong, this necessarily leaves open the 
possibility for less direct actions to satisfy this portion of the test.217   
The Supreme Court has even clarified that a “physical invasion” is most persuasive 
simply because it constitutes a “property restriction of an unusually serious 
character” and not because of any exclusive preference for the physical nature itself.218  
Further, where a physical taking has not occurred, courts have shifted their focus to 
the government justification.219  A court would be hard-pressed to justify Maryland’s 
retroactive denial of a tax credit to a particular class of citizens, whom the Supreme 
Court had already deemed to be victims of an unconstitutional tax.220 
The second prong of the Penn Central test, which considers the “extent to which 
[the action] interfered with a reasonable-investment backed expectation,” may be the 
most difficult prong for a Wynne refund claim to satisfy.  A determinant for this test 
is whether the action was foreseeable.221  The State would likely argue that the change 
in the law was foreseeable because, (1) legislative adjustments to tax codes are 
 
 215.  See id. (citing Williamson Cty. Reg’l Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)) (tying the 
“expectation interests” to a vested right, where the destruction of one destroys the other).  While this distinction 
is pertinent to each prong of the Penn Central test, it is particularly so in the context of the second prong’s 
“reasonable expectation” consideration. 
 216.  See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (“A ‘taking’ may more 
readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by [the] 
government.”). 
 217.  Id.  The Court’s use of “readily” rather than language like “is required” or “must,” suggests that the 
Court entertained the possibility of a taking being found, even where this physical element did not exist. 
 218.  Peterson, supra note 174, at 1318 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 
419, 426 (1982)). 
 219.  Id. at 1319 (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); see id.  
(connecting the Keystone Court’s shift to “asking whether the government’s actions were justified,” with the 
Court’s emphasis “that the case did not involve a physical invasion”). 
 220.  While cost can be a valid reason for government action, that reasoning does not go far enough here to 
justify the State’s failure to apply its action uniformly. 
 221.  Peterson, supra note 174, at 1320. Although this prong also requires the reliance to result in an economic 
detriment, and while the State may argue whether the denial of a tax credit constitutes such a detriment, the 
nature of this argument at its core best fits under the last prong where courts considers the value lost.  See infra 
text accompanying notes 220–23. 
Hilberg Page Proof v2 (Do Not Delete) 12/5/2016  7:34 PM 
 Charles F. Hilberg III 
Vol. 12, No. 1 2016 125 
historically commonplace, and (2) Maryland had reserved authority to revoke the 
benefit of the credit.  Courts have recognized the history of similar government 
action,222 as well as a reserved power to revoke benefits, to be indicia of 
foreseeability.223     
The foreseeability argument, however, is dramatically weakened when the change 
was applied retroactively.  Maryland may also be hesitant to argue that it has made 
similarly retroactive changes on a regular basis.224  A Wynne refund claimant could 
argue that their “reasonable expectation [was] disappointed [by] the government 
br[eaking] a promise” explicit in the original legislative mandate for a thirteen 
percent rate.225 
Finally, the third prong of the Penn Central test, which weighs the “economic 
impact” of the action, may be the easiest for a Wynne refund claimant to satisfy.  In 
this portion of the test courts have not looked at the static dollar amount of the value 
lost, but instead at the proportional value lost.226  Courts have found this portion of 
the test to be satisfied where only a diminished value is demonstrated.227  Thus, 
recognizing that the interest rate was originally set at thirteen percent and was 
retroactively reduced to roughly four percent, the value is obviously diminished.  
While the reduction in the static dollar amount owed may seem insignificant, in effect 
the state receives a seventy percent discount on the total interest it originally owed to 
the taxpayer. 
Moreover, even under the limited instances where courts have required the 
government action to deny the entire economic value of the property, a Wynne refund 
claim wouldn’t be any less likely to succeed.  As pointed out initially, it is the 
difference between the original interest rate and the reduced rate that constitutes the 
entire economic value taken.228  Thus, by reducing the interest rate from thirteen 
percent to four percent a Wynne claimant is denied the entire economic value of the 
nine percent that was originally owed.  Where a regulation reduces, but does not 
entirely eliminate the value of property, the argument that some value remains may 
 
 222.  See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986) (finding that prior legislative acts had 
given “more than sufficient notice”). 
 223.  Peterson, supra note 174, at 1321 (citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987)). 
 224.  This suggested hesitation is based purely on the undesirable imagery that could be expected to result 
from a State subscribing to this stance on how to treat residents. 
 225.  Peterson, supra note 174, at 1321. 
 226.  Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 727 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The Fifth 
Amendment draws no distinction between grand larceny and petty larceny.”); see also Peterson, supra note 174, 
at 1325 (pointing to several cases where a taking was found, notwithstanding “the loss, measured in dollars, 
[being] quite small”). 
 227.  Peterson, supra note 174, at 1325. 
 228.  See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
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be more persuasive.229  However, as would be the case in a Wynne claim, where an 
entire portion of the interest is denied, an argument that some of that portion’s value 
is still available would be precluded by nature.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Throughout the Wynne opinion the Court stayed true to its focus on the practical 
effect of interstate commerce violations, as they relate to state tax schemes.  In doing 
so, the Court crystallized a tax protection for the individual – a protection that 
formerly had only been defined for corporations.230  The Court’s decision may 
necessitate substantial reform of current state tax policy and may prompt states to 
make other adjustments to account for the ensuing lost tax revenue.231  However, by 
being cognizant of these implications and recognizing existing policies to allow for 
compliance, the Wynne decision is sound.232   
Other jurisdictions seeking to balance constitutional compliance with protecting 
their state’s own revenue streams should not look to Maryland for a solution.  In 
trying to fix one constitutional defect in its tax code, Maryland only further violated 
constitutional protections afforded to the taxpayer – all in pursuit of softening its 
financial blow from the Wynne decision.  Unfortunately for Maryland this hasty 
response will likely fail in Court, leaving the State again in need of a remedy to an 
unconstitutional tax provision. 
 
 
 229.  Peterson, supra note 174, at 1330–33 (discussing a “no economically viable use” analysis as a part of a 
separate, Agins test, not discussed in this comment).  For the purposes of understanding the reasoning behind 
this test, the two applications are identical. Id. 
 230.  Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1792 (2015) (suggesting that because corporate 
tax receives protection from “double taxation,” and because there is no reason for corporations to be treated more 
favorably than taxpayers, it is only logical for individuals to receive commensurate protections). 
 231.  See Turque, supra notes 7. 
 232.  See supra Section III.c. 
